Useful framing. Elsewhere in epistemology, figuring out direction of error (false positives vs false negatives) is key. Going without error altogether is not an option; so which error is better? Regulate processes accordingly. Doubt everything, and you’ll believe no truths. Accept everything, and you’ll disbelieve no lies. So then, the question for bitcoin: with an eye to empirical results so far, is it better to err by having too much, or too little?

I am by disposition a Descartes kind of guy; I instinctively find false positives worse than false negatives. So I have a skeptical bias. I’ve learned from experience though, that this skepticism is dangerous for my own happiness and (dare I say it, epistemic) health.

It is common enough to say that one's proper risk function varies over time; younger people should take more risks (err in the direction of loss) than older people (err in the direction of foregoing gains). A similar point applies in epistemology, I suspect. There is no one optimal error vector for everyone. Instead, it varies across people and environments and stakes. Some people should be more credulous or skeptical than others. Note: this form of epistemic relativism does not imply epistemic subjectivism (standards of proper belief formation can still be objective and stance-independent), nor does it imply pragmatic encroachment. Which is good, since I hate both of those views!