While I think ePBS is the wrong direction for the protocol, in the interest of technical accuracy I have to defend it on one thing While ePBS has an “optionality” problem, it doesn’t have a “free option” problem, because the builder’s payment is unconditional. The optionality makes the slot more valuable, so the builder should bid more in the auction This still means there will be skipped blocks, and means more MEV is being extracted from users, but the value of the option accrues to the proposer, not the builder (if building is competitive)

If you're not in the middle of crypto market structure legislative wrangling, it's probably easy to think the details don't matter. But they do. In our view, the Senate bill creates the most durable framework. Check out our full comments below.

We sent a letter this week to the Senate Banking Committee, in response to their draft of crypto market structure legislation. On the critical question of which tokens should be regulated as securities, the Senate's draft takes a very different approach from the CLARITY Act that was already passed in the House. We think the Senate's approach—"ancillary assets"—is better for crypto. While both bills are an improvement on the Howey-based regime—which is notoriously difficult to apply and creates toxic perverse incentives for issuers—the Senate draft is significantly simpler, and avoids forcing decentralized tokens and protocols to fit themselves into an inflexible legislative framework. Instead, it protects against abuse with a simple exclusion—assets that come with legal rights to specified financial interests do not qualify as ancillary assets. As we explain in the letter, we think this is the cleanest test that protects decentralized crypto assets while preventing traditional securities issuers from improperly taking advantage of this framework.

Was surprised to hear that ePBS (EIP 7732) is considered likely to be scheduled for Glamsterdam on tomorrow’s ACD call, and particularly that it’s seen as a substitute for delayed execution (such as EIP 7886) Have never heard a very good reason to do delayed execution at the consensus layer rather than the execution layer. Unlike EIP 7886, ePBS doesn’t help simplify builders—they still have to execute the full block to generate the state root As many have pointed out, the optionality problem seems bad (8 seconds for a builder to cancel their block!). Even when the option isn’t exercised, this could add a lot of latency before users can see if their transaction was included But it also just seems like yet another complex change that doesn’t do anything to help users, which I thought Ethereum was moving past

Who’s working on a treasury company for USDC?

My take: 1) This messy verdict speaks volumes. Even after weeks of testimony and underhanded government tactics, they could not convince 12 citizens that privacy software is money laundering. 2) The 1960 guilty verdict is plainly contrary to law -- but it's hard to blame the jury where the government so thoroughly distorted truth. It is imperative that DOJ clarify 1960 so this never happens again. 3) SDNY should not be permitted to retry the deadlocked charges. Most importantly, we stand with @rstormsf on all the next steps here.

The Succinct Prover Network is live on mainnet. Today, we PROVE them wrong.

Allium is the best source of Hyperliquid data I've found—great that they're making their thorough indexing of the chain more accessible

Angstrom is live! Their protocol—a real-time batch auction built on Uniswap v4 that returns its revenue to LPs—is one of the most ambitious and promising efforts to fight LVR and MEV

Roman Storm should be freed. It is not a crime to write code. It is equally absurd for SDNY to suggest charges against VCs that backed Roman.